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CANADA'S CAPACITY TO CONTROL THE
FLOW: WATER EXPORT AND THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE
AGREEMENT
Scott Philip Littlet

I.

INTRODUCTION

Of all the debate that accompanied Canadian implementation of the North American Free Trade Agreement,' there was
perhaps none more heated, manipulated, misinformed, yet
more important, than that staged over water export. 2 Critics of
NAFTA condemned the Canadian government for assenting to
an agreement that apparently granted both the United States
and Mexico unlimited access to Canada's fresh water resources. 3 It was argued that NAFTA opened the tap to a lucrative water market, one that would eventually run dry under
free trade, and sell Canada's future short.4 On the other side,
the Canadian government staunchly denied these allegations
but took few substantive measures to reassure the sceptics. 5 An
analysis of both this debate, and the text of NAFTA itself,
reveals that a wide spectrum of frequently juxtaposed legal
opinions have formed with respect to the issue of water export
and free trade.
t B.A. honors, 1991, Huron College, University of Western Ontario; L.L.B.,
1995, University of Western Ontario. The author is currently articling at Gowling,
Strathy & Henderson in Ottawa, Canada.
1 North American Free Trade Agreement, Oct. 7, 1992, text released Dec. 17,
1992, U.S.-Can.-Mex., 32 I.L.M. 612 [hereinafter NAFTA].
2 See Don Gamble, Appendix C: Workshop Summary, in CANADIAN WATER
EXPORTS AND FREE TRADE 4-5 (Rawson Academy of Aquatic Science, 1989).
3 David Hunter & Paul Orbuch, Interbasin Water Transfers After NAFTA 10
(1993) (unpublished manuscript, on file with the Center for International Environmental Law).
4 Id. at 1.
5 Divine Intervention: The Great CanadianWater Supply Proposal, Canadian
Dimension, Aug. 1994, available in LEXIS, Nexis Library, Canada File.
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This paper shall objectively assess the threat to Canada's
water resources under NAFTA. First, Part II shall examine the
present demand for Canadian water and the various means
through which water may be exported. Next, Part III shall
make note of the shortcomings and misconceptions inherent in
the argument that NAFTA robs Canada of its power to control
water export. It shall then proceed to highlight those provisions
of the Agreement under which the threat of unregulated water
export is realistic and daunting. Finally, Part -V will make one
point clear: Canada's capacity to "keep the tap closed" has not
been subsumed by the text of NAFTA. At worst, the Agreement
can work to progressively erode Canada's control over water export. The evolution of this issue will, as always, remain primarily a function of political will.

II. A BRIEF OvERviEw: THE DEMAND FOR CANADIAN WATER
AND VARIOUS WATER

EXPORT ScHEMEs

Firstly, it will be useful to examine: a) the potential water
crisis looming over the United States and Mexico with the corresponding pressures that will be placed on Canada's endowment of fresh water; and b) those proposals for water export
which may be pursued under free trade in the future.
A.

The North American Water Crisis and Canadian Water
Resources

The process of agricultural and economic development in
the American Southwest over the past one hundred years has
been nothing short of incredible. Naturally dry and formerly a
desert, this region enjoys a prosperity founded upon extensive
irrigation schemes that have fostered both agricultural and
population growth. 6 In California, vast irrigated farms which
account for much of the produce enjoyed during North American winters lie where deserts used to exist. 7 The Imperial Irri6 The Imperial Irrigation District is the largest irrigation district in the
Western Hemisphere. It consists of a 1,500 kilometer network of canals which
excrete through 50,000 kilometers of drainage tiles. The source of the water is the
Colorado River which is drained by hundreds of drainage pipes and canals to irri-

gate nearly 14,000 square kilometers of farmland. See MICHAEL KEATING, To THE
LAST DROP: CANADA AND THE WORLD'S WATER CRISIS 129-31 (1986).
7 Id. at 135.
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gation District, a 2,000 square kilometer tract of irrigated land
is responsible for the favorable farming conditions.8 In other
states such as Arizona, farmers have defied the desert climate
by successfully irrigating 5,000 square kilometers of crops. 9
This has been accomplished by drawing upon diminishing
groundwater resources in an unsustainable manner.' 0 Huge
urban centers have sprouted near these fertile lands, demanding yet more water for their industries and populations."
The fresh water resources that led to the rise of the American Southwest are dwindling under the pressures of misallocation, pollution, and the demands of an ever-increasing
population. 12 The mining of groundwater in Arizona left great
gullies in the terrain near Phoenix. 13 In the San Joaquin Valley
of California, excessive pumping of groundwater caused the
ground to compact thirty feet lower than it was fifty years ago.14
Some farmland is being abandoned as lower water tables are
rendering groundwater irrigation schemes economically
infeasible. 1
Development in the American Southwest is inextricably
connected to fresh, inexpensive water, the availability of which
will determine the region's prosperity in the future. For this
reason, the possibility of water diversion or export from Canada's abundant rivers and lakes has been discussed in the
United States over the past twenty years. 16 These discussions
may intensify in the future given that industrial development
8 Id.

at 136, 138.

9 Id. at 137.
10 Id.

11 Id.
12 Id. at 140-42.
13 Id. at 140.

14 See Christopher B. Amandes, Comment, ControllingLand Surface Subsidence: A Proposalfor a Market-Based Regulatory Scheme, 31 UCLA L. REV. 1208,
1246 (1984).
15 For this reason, some writers suggest that there is not a true water crisis in
the United States; rather, there is a cheap water crisis. Perhaps if water was not
so inexpensive, conservation would be a more common attribute of North American
water management policies. See RICHARD C. BocianG, CANADIAN WATER: A COMMODITY FOR EXPORT? 5 (1986).

16 See Mel Clark and Don Gamble, Water Exports and Free Trade, in CANADIAN WATER EXPORTS AND FREE TRADE 20 (A.L.C. de Mestral and D.M. Leith eds.,

1989).
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in both Mexico and the United States under NAFTA will create
17
a greater demand for fresh water.
The potential returns for Canada from a large-scale water
market are astounding. In British Columbia,' 8 the amount
paid by local water export firms to the provincial government is
estimated at between $9 and $18 (Canadian) per acre-foot.' 9
However, the price secured for water under one export contract
to California was reportedly between $2,700 and $3,400
(U.S.).20 By creating a free trade zone among the three coun-

tries of North America, NAFTA will facilitate and may require
the creation of an international water market.
B. PotentialSchemes for Water Export
While water export can take many forms, some schemes
are more economically feasible and realistic than others. However, all of the following proposals continue to be considered as
undertakings that could be employed in transporting Canadian
water to market.
1. Large-Scale Water Diversion
Technically, a water diversion is not tantamount to the export of water. Rather, it envisions the damming, flooding and
altering of water courses in a manner that forces water to flow
to a desired destination. 21 Perhaps the best known and most
environmentally threatening of such engineering proposals is
the North American Water and Power Alliance (NAWAPA).
This diversion scheme was developed in 1964 by the Los Angeles based Ralph M. Parsons Company. 22 The project entails the
damming of the major rivers of Alaska and British Columbia,
and the diversion of this water into the Rocky Mountain
17 See Hunter & Orbuch, supra note 3, at 20.

18 It should be noted at this point that because of both British Columbia's
extensive water resources and its proximity to the American Southwest, most of
the debate over water export revolves around this province. As such, much of the
discussion in this paper shall focus upon water export as it relates to British
Columbia.
19 An acre-foot of water has 325,851 gallons and will cover one acre of land
with one foot of water. See Hunter & Orbuch, supra note 3, at 3.
20 NAFTA AND WATER EXPORTS 56 (Canadian Environmental Law Association, 1993).
21 FRANK E. Moss, THE WATER Cmsis, 245 (1968).
22

Id.
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Trench, resulting in the creation of a 500 mile fresh water lake
running the length of British Columbia. 23 From here, water
would be channelled into a system of canals snaking about the
24
continent.
The by-products of the NAWAPA would be awesome while
devastating. The project would generate electricity, develop a
system of continental navigation, and allocate fresh water to agricultural regions most in need of irrigation. 25 In total it would
contribute to the water needs of seven Canadian provinces and
one territory, thirty-seven U.S. states, and three states of Mex-

ico. 2 6 However, costing upwards of $200 billion, 2 7 the NAWAPA

would result in obvious destruction to fish stalks, human settlement and vast stands of forest.28 Despite the financial and social costs, the NAWAPA proposal may yet be revisited in the
future, and it would undoubtedly be facilitated in the atmosphere of free trade. 29 This is a sobering thought in a country
30
that diverts more water than any country on earth.
2.

Water Export by Pipeline

More easily construed as water export, pipeline proposals
are a somewhat more realistic means of bringing water to a
market. Although there are no significant water pipelines runId. at 249.
Id. at 248-52.
25 Id. at 242-54.
26 Id. at 243.
27 Hunter & Orbuch, supra note 3, at 4.
28 Hunter & Orbuch, supra note 3, at 4.
29 Another similar project that has been proposed for the eastern portion of
Canada is the Great Recycling and Northern Development Canal Scheme [hereinafter GRAND Canal]. This proposal encompasses the construction of a dike
stretching across James Bay which, in conjunction with the flow of rivers into the
Bay, would eventually create a large fresh water lake. The flows of the rivers
would then be reversed and water would be channelled into the Great Lakes.
From there the water would be re-routed through canals that span the continent.
For a detailed analysis of the GRAND Canal proposal see Paul Muldoon, Scenario
D: The GRAND Canal Proposal, in CANADIN WATER EXPORTS AND FREE TRADE
23
24

97-113 (Rawson Academy of Aquatic Science, 1989). See also THE GREAT RECYCLING AND NORTHERN DEVELOPMENT (GRAND) CANAL: NOTES FOR A SUBMISSION
TO THE INQUIRY ON FEDERAL WATER POLICY (St. John's, Newfoundland ed., 1984).
30 Canada has over 600 dams and 60 large interbasin water transfers. See
J.C. DAY & FRANK Qunv, Dams and Diversions: Learningfrom the CanadianExperience, in PROCEEDINGS OF THE SYMPOSIUM ON INTERBASN TRANSFER OF WATER:
IMPACTS AND RESEARCH NEEDS FOR CANADA 45 (1987).
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ning from Canada to the American Southwest,3 1 a proposal that
envisions a water diversion in conjunction with a pipeline has
been made in the province of British Columbia.3 2 The Multinational Resources Proposal is a $3.8 billion Canadian-American
joint venture that would divert water from the North Thompson
River into the Columbia River.3 3 After having run through a
series of power generating stations, the water would then enter
34
a 400 mile pipeline leading to California.
William Clancey, who orchestrates the Canadian side of the
proposal, contends that the project would generate huge profits
for the province of British Columbia. 35 Requiring up to one
thousand workers and five million hours of labor for its completion, the project would continue to generate 100,000 hours of
employment annually.3 6 Clancey contends that as a further
benefit to the province, the power generating facilities would
create $24.2 million (Canadian) annually in revenues for the
province.3 7 Lamenting that the New Democratic Party government of British Columbia has been completely unreceptive to
his plan, Clancey has not recently pursued the Multinational
Resources proposal.38 However, it shall be illustrated in Part
III of this paper that the proposal could indeed come to fruition
under NAFTA.

31 There do exist some privately owned water pipelines that cross the Canadian-U.S. border in the province of British Columbia. However, these are confined
to local agricultural use and predate the concept of a water market. Telephone

Interview with Richard Penner, Manager, British Columbia Water Management
Licensing (Feb. 28, 1995).
32 See Clifford J. Villa, CaliforniaDreaming:Water Transfersfrom the Pacific
Northwest, 23 ENVTL. L. 997, 1011 (1993).
33 Id. at 1011.
34 NAFTA AND WATER EXPORTS, supra note 20, at 65.

35 Telephone Interview with William Clancey, President, Multinational
Water & Power Inc. (Mar. 7, 1995).
36 Telephone Interview with William Clancey, supra note 35.

37 Telephone Interview with William Clancey, supra note 35.
38 Telephone Interview with William Clancey, supra note 35. Ironically, Richard Penner, states that the British Columbia government breathed "a sigh of relief" when the Multinational Resources Proposal was abandoned; for reasons to be
discussed, the realization of plans such as the Multinational Resources Proposal
can only be facilitated in the trade environment created by NAFTA. Telephone
Interview with Richard Penner, supra note 31.
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Supertanker Water Exports

Bulk water exports by marine vessels are perhaps the most
feasible means of transporting water to a market. The process
requires little overhead on behalf of an enterprise. 39 Moreover,
relative to other proposals, supertanker exports entail the least
amount of environmental damage as marine vessels essentially
draw fresh water from coastal streams. 40 Perhaps for this reason, four supertanker licenses presently exist in British Columbia.4 1 However, the province has recently been inundated with
applications for such licenses. 42 With demand for fresh water
increasing in states such as California, 4 3 the number of applications in British Columbia for supertanker licenses will only continue to increase.
III. THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT: Is TE
TAP TO WATER EXPORT Now OPEN?

With the various proposals for the large-scale diversion and
export of water in mind, this paper shall first examine the reasons underlying opposition to NAFTA as it relates to Canada's
water resources. Many critics of the Agreement sounded alarm
in response to two apparently grim realities. First, Canada
wanted to enter into a liberalized trade deal with countries facing increased demands for dwindling water supplies because
they would eventually need to rely upon Canada's vast fresh
water reserves. Second, both the text of the proposed Agreement and government actions appeared ambivalent toward the
threat free trade posed for one of Canada's most important
resources.
A.

Water Export and Chapter Three of NAFTA: National
Treatment and Market Access for Goods

As Parliament debated NAFTA in the spring of 1993, concern over the future of Canada's water resources was raised as
it had been prior to the implementation of the Free Trade
Telephone
Telephone
41 Telephone
42 Telephone

Interview
Interview
Interview
Interview

with Richard Penner, supra note
with Richard Penner, supra note
with Richard Penner, supra note
with Richard Penner, supra note
43 See NAFTA AND WATER EXPORTS supra note 20.
39
40

31.
31.
31.
31.
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Agreement in 1988. 44 Once again, the monumental engineering
schemes for water diversion appeared all the more possible in
the soon to be established, liberalized trade environment of
North America. Fears that Canada would lose control over its
water resources seemed to be substantiated by both the text of
NAFTA and government response to public concern.
1.

Chapter Three Provisions of NAFTA

The primary objectives of NAFTA are both the elimination
of barriers to trade, and the facilitation of cross border movements of goods and services between the territories of the Parties to the Agreement. 4 5 Goods of a Party are identified in
Article 201 of the Agreement as "domestic products as these are
understood in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade or
such goods as the Parties may agree." 4 6 The General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT), 4 7 defines water in the following manner:
Waters, including natural or artificial mineral water and aerated
sugar or other sweetening matter
waters, not containing added
48
snow.
and
ice
nor flavored;
An explanatory note to the tariff item provides that water
includes "ordinary natural water of all kinds (other than sea
water... )."49 The incorporation of this definition into NAFTA
lead many to believe that the water of Canada's rivers and
lakes could be construed as a trade good under the Agreement.
It would be difficult to exclude any form of water, other than
those already excluded, from the GATT definition of water.
Critics of the proposed Agreement argued that this inclusion restricted the legal means by which Canada could restrict
44 For the most part, the principles enshrined by NAFTA are a reiteration of
those in the Free Trade Agreement. As a result, much of the concern voiced over
Canada's water resources and NAFTA was essentially a revisitation of those issues raised during the Canada-U.S. free trade debate. Free Trade Agreement,
Dec. 22, 1987, Can.-U.S. 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988) [hereinafter FTA].
45 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 102(1)(a), 32 I.L.M. 297.
46 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 201, 32 I.L.M. 298.

47

55 U.N.T.S. 188.

48 Jon Johnson, Water Exports and Free Trade: Another Perspective, in CANADIAN WATER EXPORTS AND FREE TRADE 25, 27 (1989).
49 BARRY APPLETON, NAVIGATING NAFTA: A CONCISE USER'S GUIDE TO THE
NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT 201 (1994).
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large-scale exports of water.5 0 They argued that Canada had
forfeited its rights to protect its water resources under Chapter
Three of NAFTA concerning National Treatment and Market
Access for Goods. 5 1 Article 301 of the Agreement requires that
each Party "accord national treatment to the goods of another
party in accordance with Article III of the General Agreement
on Tariffs and Trade." 52 National treatment in this context requires that the interests of one Party are treated equally to the
interests of another, with respect to similar goods of trade.
More specifically, a NAFTA country is generally free to follow
any policy, or implement any regulation that it wishes, provided
that in doing so, it is not attempting to protect its own indus53
tries by discriminating against the goods of another Party.
Critics contended that the national treatment obligation extended to both imports and exports, and that once the tap of
large scale water diversion to the south was turned on, it would
be impossible for Canada to turn the tap off without curbing its
54
own domestic use.
This fear was substantiated by further provisions in Chapter Three of NAFTA relating to market access for goods. Annex
301.3 of the Agreement provides that the national treatment obligation does not apply to Canadian restrictions upon the export
of logs of all species, or the export of unprocessed fish from the
Maritime provinces or Quebec. 55 Repeated demands were made
in Parliament 56 that a similar exclusion for bulk water exports
be inserted into the Agreement, yet Annex 301.3 makes no such
provision. Government neglect in the resolution of this contenClark & Gamble, supra note 16, at 10.
Id. at 11.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 301, 32 I.L.M. 299.
53 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 301, 32 I.L.M. 300. "National Treatment," one of
the basic tenets of both NAFTA and GATT, strikes an important balance in a free
trade agreement. It damages the sovereignty of a nation less than "harmonization," which obliges Parties to follow or implement the same policies. On the other
hand, Parties enjoy the benefit of open foreign markets in that their trade partners
may not discriminate against their goods. See RICHARD G. LIPSEY, DANIEL
SCHWANEN, & RONALD J. WONNACOTT, THE NAFTA; WHAT'S IN, WHAT'S OUT,
WHAT'S NEXT 159 (1994). For a discussion of the principle of national treatment,
see infra part III.B.2.a.
54 Hunter & Orbuch, supra note 3, at 11.
55 NAFTA, supra note 1, 32 I.L.M. 305.
56 Marlene Catterall, speech in Debates of the House of Commons (May 28,
1993), at 19974; see also the speech of Hon. Lloyd Axworthy. Id. at 20025.
50
51
52
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tious issue led many to conclude that water exports were, in
fact, on the Tory trade agenda. 57 To these charges Trade Minister Michael Wilson stated, "[there is no exemption for water in
the NAFTA because it is not necessary to insert an exemption
from obligations that do not exist."5 8 Despite Wilson's reassurances, it appeared that Annex 301.3 created an exemption for
specific exports from the national treatment obligation. 5 9 Many
analysts accordingly believed that all other exports were therefore included under the national treatment obligations of Chapter Three and that Canada had relinquished its capacity to
60
control the export of its water.
Further provisions of NAFTA seemed to fortify the contention that water would flow unregulated from Canada to the
south after the Agreement came into force. Article 314 provides
that no Party may impose export taxes, such as an environmental surcharge, upon the export of any good unless a similar tax
applies to the good in the domestic market. 6 1 Therefore, the
right to impose a tax that could be prohibitive to the point
where the export of water would be economically infeasible does
not exist under the Agreement. Moreover, Article 309 stipulates that no Party may restrict the "exportation or sale for export of any good destined for the territory of another Party,
except in accordance with Article XI of the GATT." 6 2 However,
under Article XI Canada would have to be approaching a "critical shortage" of its water supply before it may invoke such a
57 Note that regardless of whether water was on the trade agenda, it was a
valuable bargaining chip for Canada. The political reality of the situation was that
Canada would have lost a NAFTA benefit in return for an outright exclusion of its
water in the Agreement. See Catterall, supra note 56; see also Michael Wilson,
Concern Over Water and NAFTA Not Based on Fact, VICTORIA TIMES COLONIST
(May 2, 1993).
58 Wilson, supra note 57.
59 See Hunter & Orbuch, supra note 3, at 11.
60 This view was expressed on both sides of the border. See NAFTA AND
WATER EXPORTS, supra note 20, at 6; Hunter & Orbuch, supra note 3, at 11.
61 See NAFTA, supra note 1, 32 I.L.M. 303.
62 NAFTA, supra note 1, 32 I.L.M. 303. GATT Article XI, paragraph 2(a) provides the most realistic scenario in which an export restriction upon water would
become necessary and justifiable under NAFTA: "Export prohibitions or restrictions temporarily applied to prevent or relieve critical shortages of foodstuffs or
other products essential to the exporting contracting party." GATT, supra note 47,
55 U.N.T.S. 188; reprinted in JOHN H. JACKSON, WORLD TRADE AND THE LAW OF
GATT 818 (1969).
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restriction. 63 This was obviously not considered a desirable
remedy as it is founded upon a nightmare scenario that opponents of free trade aimed to prevent.
Another GATT provision, Article XX(g), is incorporated into
NAFTA and permits export restrictions relating to the conservation of exhaustible natural resources such as water.6 4 Under
Article XX(g), Canada would be able to apply a restriction upon
the exports of water but such restrictions must be made in conjunction with similar restrictions upon domestic production and
consumption. 65 This proportionality requirement is made even
66
more rigorous by the conditions in Article 315 of NAFTA.
First, a restriction placed upon water exports may not decrease
proportional access to total supplies of Canadian water that an67
other NAFTA Party enjoyed over the previous three years.
Second, in imposing a restriction, Canada may not impose a
higher price for water export through the use of licenses, fees, or
taxes, than the price charged domestically. 68 Therefore, both
the "critical shortage" and the "exhaustible natural resource"
restrictions on water exports were effectively rendered useless
by Article 315.69 Under a future domestic water crisis, Canada
would be obligated to bear the proportional burden of dwindling
supplies and increasing prices with those NAFTA Parties to
whom it exported.
6 JACKSON, supra note 62, at 818.
64 Article 2101 of NAFTA states that

Article XX(g) of GATT may be invoked
as a general exception provided that any measures taken do not constitute an "arbitrary or unjustifiable discrimination ... or a disguised restriction on trade between the Parties." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 2101, 32 I.L.M. 699.
65 This standard has been strictly interpreted in the past. In 1989, the U.S.Canada Binational Panel presiding over the Salmon and Herring case established
the applicable test under Article XX(g): "How genuine the conservation purpose of
a measure is, must be determined by whether the government would have been
prepared to adopt that measure if its own nationals had to bear the actual costs of
the measure." In the Matter of Canada'sLanding Requirement for Pacific Coast
Salmon and Herring,U.S.- Canada Binational Final Report, CDA 89-1807-01 (Oct.
16, 1989), available in LEXIS, Itrade Library, USCFTA file.
66 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 315, 32 I.L.M. 303. Note that Article 315 applies
to both Article XX(g) and Article XI.2(a) of GATT. See supra note 64 and accompanying text for a discussion of Article XX(g).
67 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 315(1)(a), 32 I.L.M. 303.
68 See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 315(1)(b), 32 I.L.M. 303.
69

See NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 315, 32 I.L.M. 303.
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Government Half-Measures

The Conservative government made one consistent reply to
the critics of the proposed Agreement on free trade: there was
no need to make an exclusion for water in NAFTA because appropriate measures had already been taken to protect Canada's
water.70 In response to concerns voiced over the FTA, the Conservatives had already implemented the Federal Water Policy
in 1987. 71 The Federal Water Policy was touted by the Conservatives as the instrument that would prevent the export of water
should the need arise. 7 2 This contention is tenuous at best. The
provisions of NAFTA will take primacy over any domestic legislation or policy of the Parties to the Agreement. 73 Moreover, the
Conservative government had not, as the Policy provided, taken
any measures to "strengthen federal legislation" with respect to
water exports.7 4 Bill C-156, entitled the Canadian Water Preservation Act, was introduced to "prohibit outright large-scale
freshwater exports and strictly regulate small-scale water sales
such as those by tanker."75 However, when Parliament adjourned in 1988, this bill died on the order paper and was not
debated any further.7 6
70

See generally, Charles Langlois, Debates of the House of Commons (May 28,

1993).
71 See Hunter & Orbuch, supra note 3, at 14. The Policy stated that the federal government would take all possible measures within the limits of its constitutional authority to prohibit the export of Canadian water by interbasin diversions
and strengthen federal legislation to the extent necessary to fully implement the
policy. FEDERAL WATER POLICY, (Environment Canada, 1987).
72 See, e.g., the speech of Mr. Charles Langlois in Debatesof the House of Commons (May 28, 1993) at 20008.
73 See APPLETON, supra note 49, at 202.
74 See generally, FEDERAL WATER POLICY, supra note 71.
75 See the tabling of Bill C-156 by Minister of the Environment, Mr. Tom McMillan in Debates of the House of Commons (Aug. 28, 1988) at 18818.
76 Many critics argued that, had the Canadian Water Resources Act been
passed, it would have had no force under the FTA or NAFTA and would not have
effectively prohibited water exports. See Clark & Gamble, supra note 16, at 17.
However, while the proposed law was not passed it would have given Canada more
control over its water resources. An act prohibiting the large-scale export of water
or regulating small-scale water sales would be consistent with Chapter Three of
NAFTA in most respects. For reasons to be discussed in the next section of this
paper, only those few contracts for water export that existed prior to the passing of
such a law would be subject to the stringent proportional sharing obligations of
NAFTA.
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The North American Free Trade Implementation Act of
1993, 77 which made NAFTA part of Canadian domestic law, is
an example of further governmental half-measures. Section
7(2) of this legislation provides that water "packaged as a beverage or in tanks," but not "natural, surface and ground water," is
included under the national treatment obligations of NAFTA. 7s
However, while this provision illustrates the position of Canadian domestic law, one Party's unilateral decision upon the
terms of NAFTA will have no effect upon the interpretation of
the Agreement.7 9 With no specific exclusion for water in the actual text of NAFTA, many charged that half-measures such as
section 7(2) of the Implementation Act were made so that largescale interbasin transfers of water could be facilitated in the
80
forthcoming environment of liberalized trade.
3. Truths About Water Export and Chapter Three of NAFTA
Fears over Canadian water are both understandable and
justifiable. The juxtaposition of the commitments made in the
Federal Water Policy of 1987 and the failure of the Canadian
government to reassure the public of its control over its country's water resources under NAFTA, indicates a less than sincere effort in setting the water export issue straight. However,
many of the fears and allegations raised over water export and
Chapter Three of NAFTA are both unfounded and circumventable. Indeed, the amount of misinformation that has circulated
over the issue has made the problem seem more daunting and
insurmountable for Canada than is the case. Misconceptions
revolve around the type of bulk water export that will be subject
77 R.S.C. 1993, c.44 [hereinafter Implementation Act].
78 See APPLETON, supra note 49, at 202.
79 Article 31(2)(b) of the Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties provides

that "any instrument which was made by one or more parties in connection with
the conclusion of the treaty" may be used "for the purpose of interpretation." Vienna Convention on the Law of Treaties, opened for signature May 23, 1969, 1155
U.N.T.S. 331, reprintedin 8 I.L.M. 679 (1969). However, an instrument like the
Implementation Act, must also be "accepted by the other parties as an instrument
related to the treaty" to have any effect. If the export of waters excluded by the

Implementation Act was at issue in a dispute between Canada and another Party,
Article 7(2) would obviously not have been "accepted by the other parties" and it
would have no effect on the interpretation of NAFTA. See Implementation Act,
supra note 77.
80 See generally, Hunter & Orbuch, supra note 3.
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to the terms of NAFTA and Canada's capacity to regulate such
export.
a.

Forms of Water Export That Will Be Subject to Chapter
Three Obligations

First and foremost, the massive water diversion proposals,
such as NAWAPA, do not subject Canadian water to the Market
Access and National Treatment for Goods obligations of
NAFTA. 8 1 Under such proposals water cannot be construed as
a good for trade. One need only examine the understandings
that have been struck between the Parties to NAFTA with respect to this issue. On December 2, 1993, the governments of
Canada, the United States and Mexico made a joint and public
statement that NAFTA creates no rights to the natural water
resources of any Party to the Agreement. More specifically,
[u]nless water, in any form, has entered into commerce and become a good or product, it is not covered by the provisions of any
trade agreement, including the NAFTA. And nothing in the
NAFTA would oblige any NAFTA Party to either exploit its water
for commercial use, or to begin exporting water in any form.
Water in its natural state in lakes, rivers, reservoirs, aquifers,
waterbasins and the like is not a good or product, is not traded,
and therefore is not and never has been subject to the terms of
any trade agreement. 82
This declaration is by no means legally binding upon the Parties to NAFTA; at best, it can be considered as "soft law" 3 that
may affect a Party's conduct. However, it illustrates that for
the provisions of Chapter Three to apply, water will likely have
81 See generally, Hunter & Orbuch, supra note 3.
82 Office of the Prime Minister, Release, Prime Minister Announces NAFTA
improvements; Canada To Proceed With Agreement, (Dec. 2, 1993). See also Letter
of United State Trade Representative Mickey Kantor in APPLETON, supra note 49,
at 202 (providing that "when water is traded as a good, all provisions of the Agreements governing trade in goods apply.").
83 While soft law or lex ferenda is not directly enforceable in domestic courts
or international tribunals, its application may eventually lead to the formation of
new international law. For example, Article 31(2)(a) of the Vienna Convention on
the Law of Treaties provides that "any agreement relating to the treaty which was
made between all the parties" may be used for the purpose of interpretation of the
treaty. Vienna Convention of the Law of Treaties, supra note 79, art. 31(2)(a), 1155
U.N.T.S. 331. See INTERNATIONAL LAW CHIEFLY AS INTERPRETED AND APPLIED IN
CANADA 78 (Hugh M. Kindred, et. al. eds., 5th ed. 1993).
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to be taken out of its natural state and processed for trade.
Only when it is exploited in this manner will it become a good
pursuant to NAFTA.
The actual text of NAFTA substantiates this point of view.
It has already been mentioned that Article 201 of NAFTA defines the "goods of a Party" as "domestic products as these are
84
understood in the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade."
Therefore, for an item to be a "good" under NAFTA, it must be a
"product" under GATT.8- While GATT does not define the
meaning of a "product," the Oxford English Dictionary defines it
as "a thing produced."8 6 Therefore, "ordinary natural waters of
all kinds" under the GATT tariff heading, must be "produced" in
some way to be considered a "good."8 7 It would be difficult to
contend that the creation of a large reservoir or the diversion of
a river (where water remains in its natural state) is tantamount
to the production of water. Water would have to be taken from
its natural element and gathered in tanks, a pipeline or a vessel
for it to become a "product" under GATT and a "good" under
NAFTA.
For this reason, should the Canadian government make the
unfortunate decision to proceed with one of the massive plans of
watershed altering diversion in the future, it could still close
the tap and not violate Chapter Three of NAFTA.88 This water
would not be considered a "good" and therefore a tax, prohibition, or other restriction placed upon its diversion would not violate Articles 309, 314 or 315 of NAFTA. Only when water is
produced in a way contrary to NAFTA will the onerous obligations of Chapter Three apply to water export.

NAFTA, supra note 1, 32 I.L.M. 298.
85 See Johnson, supra note 48, at 28.
84

86 THE NEW SHORTER OxFoRD ENGLISH DICTIONARY 2367 (4th ed. 1993).
87

See Johnson, supra note 48, at 28.

88 Given the incredible breadth of these projects and the environmental de-

struction that their assemblance would entail, one may question whether the Canadian government would ever hold the conservation of our water resources as a
priority in the future. Moreover, it is unlikely that any one government would be
able to take unilateral measures in a multinational arrangement such as the
NAWAPA. See, e.g., Hunter & Orbuch, supra note 3, at 3.
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Canada's Capacity to Regulate the Export of Water

Many opponents of NAFTA noted that Canada made exceptions to the national treatment obligation for certain exports in
Annex 301.3 of the Agreement.8 9 With this provision in mind,
these opponents claimed that as a general rule, the national
treatment obligation of Article 301 must apply to both imports
and exports.9 0 However, this contention is erroneous given that
Article 301 is to be interpreted "in accordance with Article III of
the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade."9 1 It is generally
accepted that the national treatment obligation of Article III
does not apply to exports. 92 Therefore, this interpretation of
GATT can be extended to Article 301 of NAFTA.9 3 Other provisions of Chapter Three relating specifically to export taxes and
export restrictions also suggest that exports are to be treated
94
with standards different than that of national treatment.
Certain conclusions can be drawn at this point. First, because the national treatment obligation does not apply to exports in the same manner that it applies to imports, Canada is
not legally bound to make water available in its natural state,
or as a "good" to other NAFTA countries. Under the national
treatment obligation of Chapter Three, Canada possesses complete control over its water resources up to the moment it
grants another NAFTA country a licence for the exportation of
Canadian water. 9 5 Because water in its natural state cannot be
construed as a "good" for the purposes of Chapter Three, and
because it cannot become a "good" until an exporter is granted a
license to produce it into a "good," stringent licensing requirements will serve to effectively regulate water export. Thus,
Canada can regulate its water resources before they become
89 Hunter & Orbuch, supra note 3, at 11.
90 Clark & Gamble, supra note 16.

91 Hunter & Orbuch, supra note 3, at 10; Article 301(1) sets out the GATT
national treatment obligation. See NAFTA supra note 1, 32 I.L.M. 299.
92 Under Article III of GATT, "exported products can be taxed or regulated in
a manner different from those products that remain in the domestic market."
JACKSON, supra note 62, at 499.
93 See APPLETON, supra note 49, at 203.
94 NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 314, 315, 32 I.L.M. 303.

95 It will be illustrated later in this paper that the provinces are generally
responsible for the granting of export licenses. In this section "Canada" is used for
greater simplicity.
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"goods" and as such it has not sacrificed any sovereignty over its
water until it chooses to do so.
Second, no exporter can avail itself of the proportional sharing requirements of Articles 314 and 315, unless it has already
been granted a license to export Canadian water. Again, this
situation can only flow from a Canadian decision allowing for
export. Moreover, the number of presently existing water export licenses in Canada is negligible and those that do exist are
not large-scale projects. 96 Therefore, in the event of an export
restriction on Canadian water, it would not be burdensome to
meet the proportional sharing requirement of Article 315, since
the proportion of total Canadian water available as a "good" the
United States currently enjoys is essentially zero. Unless Canada's lakes and rivers have practically run dry, it would not be
difficult to maintain this small proportion under an export
restriction.
In the final analysis, Canada has not lost control over its
water resources as a result of the Chapter Three provisions of
NAFTA. The great engineering proposals for the interbasin
transfer of water do not make a "good" out of water and would
not bring the obligations of Chapter Three of NAFTA into effect.
Moreover, contrary to what many critics of the Agreement submit, Canada may regulate its water resources before they become "goods" and thereby avoid the onerous restrictions placed
upon the export measures included in Chapter Three. Only
when licenses for the export of water are granted will such restrictions come into effect.
While this analysis presupposes both wise management
and a desire to conserve Canadian water resources on its government's behalf, the analysis illustrates that Canada's water
is not threatened by free trade in the manner that many contend. While it is hoped that these particular misconceptions
have been clarified, the following section shall illustrate that
another part of NAFTA poses more of a threat to Canada's sovereignty over water export.
96 For example, in British Columbia where there is the greatest potential and
demand for water export, only four licenses currently exist. All of these allow for
the export of water to the United States through the use of supertankers. Hunter
& Orbuch, supra note 3.
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Water Export and Chapter Eleven of NAFTA: Investment

It is surprising that the provisions in NAFTA regarding investment were not condemned by critics of the Agreement.
Herein lie the true problems that free trade poses for Canada
with respect to its control over water resources.
1.

Foreign Investment in a Free Trade Zone

An essential component of any free trade agreement is the
establishment of a domestic environment that fosters growth in
foreign investment. Canada's well-being which is dependent
upon foreign investment, reached $490 billion (Canadian) in
1991. 9 7 The United States is the largest foreign investor in
Canada, representing about 65% of foreign direct investment. 98
U.S. policy has consistently favored both the establishment "of
international legal protection for foreign investment and.., the
elimination of obstacles to the entry of such investment." 9 9 Not
surprisingly, the Chapter Eleven investment provisions of
NAFTA are structured to meet these goals. 100
2.

Legal ProtectionAccorded to Investment under NAFTA
and Its Potential Impact Upon Water Export

a.

National Treatment: Article 1102

Similar to Chapter Three of NAFTA, Chapter Eleven imposes national treatment obligations upon the Parties to the
Agreement. However, the provisions of Chapter Eleven are far
more onerous and threatening to Canada when the issue of
water export is considered. Even before water is traded as a
"good," Article 1102 requires Canada to extend treatment no
less favorable to investors and investments of another Party
than that which is accorded to similar Canadian interests.' 0 '
At a provincial or state level this treatment must be the same
97

See,

MINISTER OF INDUSTRY, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY,

Canada'sInterna-

tional Investment Position, in INVESTMENT CANADA (1991).
98 Id.
99 Steven C. Nelson, The Investment Provisionsof the Free Trade Agreement:
A United States Perspective in UNITED STATES/CANADA FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:
THE ECONOMIC AND LEGAL IMPLICATIONS 45-52 (1988).
100 Indeed, one of the prime objectives of the investment provisions was to liberalize the restrictive Mexican investment regime for the benefit of Canadian and
American foreign investors. Id.
101 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1102(3), 32 I.L.M. 639.
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and investments of naas that treatment accorded to investors
10 2
tionals of that province or state.
The National Treatment Obligation draws no distinction
between exports and imports. It imposes strict obligations upon
literally all aspects of foreign investment by extending itself to
"the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, con10
duct, operation, and sale or other disposition of investments."

3

Article 1139 defines the term "investment" in such a broad manner that it could cover even the most tenuous of interests held
by foreign investors. 0 4 In general, it works to protect any proprietary right held by an investor of a NAFTA Party in
05
Canada.
The broad legal rights and protections afforded to investors
translate into the greatest threat to Canada's water resources.
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1102(3), 32 I.L.M. 639.
103 NAFTA, supra note 1, arts. 1102(3), 1102(2), 32 I.L.M. 639.
104 For example, the Article 1139 definition of investment includes:
(a) an enterprise;...
(d) a loan to an enterprise;
(e)an interest in an enterprise that entitles the owner to share in income or
profits of the enterprise;...
(g) real estate or other property, tangible or intangible, acquired in the expectation or used for the purpose of economic benefit or other business purpose; and
(h) interests arising from the commitment of capital or other resources in
the territory of a Party to economic activity in such territory ....
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1139, 32 I.L.M. 647.
Article 1139 also provides that the benefits of the chapter are available to investors of non-Parties whose particular investments are incorporated into a
NAFTA country and who wish to expand into another NAFTA country. As a result, NAFTA creates an attractive investment environment in Canada for all countries dependent upon foreign investment. See ExTERNAL AFFAIRS AND
INTERNATIONAL TRADE CANADA, NAFTA: WHAT'S IT ALL ABoUT? 61 (1993).
105 These NAFTA provisions are buttressed by the Organization for Economic
Cooperation and Development [hereinafter OECD] recognition of national treatment as a ftundamental condition for the creation of foreign investment. See OR102

GANIZATION FOR ECONOMIC COOPERATION AND DEVELOPMENT, NATIONAL TREATMENT

FOR FOREIGN-CONTROLLED ENTERPRISES 54 (1993). The OECD, which is composed

of 24 developed countries, including Canada and the U.S., accounting for three
quarters of world trade, stated in its Declaration on International Investment and
Multinational Enterprises that, "[miember countries should ... accord to enterprises operating in their territories and owned or controlled directly or indirectly
by nationals of another Member country... treatment under their laws, regula-

tions and administrative practices, consistent with international law and no less
favourable than that accorded in like situations to domestic enterprises." OECD
Declaration on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises, June 21,

1976, reprinted in 15 I.L.M. 967-68.
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First and foremost, Canada's right 0 6 to choose whether to allow
the exportation of water to another NAFTA Party, is subsumed
by the national treatment obligations in Article 1102. As the
obligation applies to "the establishment, acquisition, expansion,
management, conduct, operation, and sale or other disposition
of investments," 10 7 investors from all NAFTA countries must be
treated equally. Therefore, future American investors, wishing
to establish an enterprise in British Columbia that will carry
out supertanker exports of water to California, must be extended the same treatment granted to the four present holders
of supertanker export licenses in the province. More specifically, Canada must allow the further export of water, regardless
of how it wishes to manage the resource.' 08 In a more ominous
scenario, if a massive water diversion scheme was undertaken
in Canada, the national treatment obligation would erode government control over similar future engineering proposals.' 0 9

106 The Canadian provinces are generally responsible for granting water export licenses. Section 92(10) of the British North America Act confers upon the
provinces jurisdiction over "local works and undertakings." British North America
Act, 1867, 30 & 31 Vict. c. 3, § 92(10) (U.K.). Section 92(13) creates provincial
jurisdiction over "property and civil rights" and therefore the power to regulate
land use and most forms of business activity. Id. at § 92(13). The provinces may
also make laws respecting non-renewable natural resources under section 92A, a
category into which some forms of water may fall. Id. at § 92A. However, note also
that under section 92(10)(a), an undertaking such as a pipeline, that extends beyond the limits of a province, falls under the jurisdiction of the federal government.
Id. at § 92(1)(a). Moreover, Parliament could assert federal jurisdiction upon other
interjurisdictional water issues such as large-scale water diversions. By contrast,
the United States Congress has virtually unlimited power to legislate over water
resource matters. See PETER W. HOGG, CONsTrruTIONAL LAw OF CANADA, 713-733
(3rd ed. 1992); see also BARRY BARTON, InterregionalCooperationon Resource Management: CooperativeManagement of InterprovincialWater Resources, in MANAGING NATURAL RESOURCES IN A FEDERAL STATE 234-56 (J. Owen Saunders, ed. 1985).
107 NAFTA, supra note 1, 32 I.L.M. 639.
108 Note that since 1991, there has been a moratorium in British Columbia
upon the issuance of new licenses for supertanker exports and the removal of
water from streams. O.I.C. 1991/331, B.C. Gaz. 1991. The Order in Council imposing the moratorium has been extended four times and is designed to prevent
further exporting until the passing of new water export legislation in British Columbia. Telephone Interview with Lyn Krywoken, Manager of Water Section and
Policy, British Columbia, Ministry of the Environment (Feb. 28, 1995).
109 Thus, the premise that Canada may decide whether or not to turn on the
tap for water export, is severely limited by the investment provisions in Chapter
11 of NAFTA. See generally, NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, 32 I.L.M. 639.
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Compensation for the Expropriation of An Investment:
Article 1110

The breadth of the definition of "investment" in Chapter
Eleven is buttressed by provisions regarding expropriation and
compensation of investments. 110 To date, no NAFTA Party has
made a claim of expropriation under Article 1110.11 However,
the pivotal issue in a future claim will be the meaning extended
to the term "expropriation." Although no definition has been
provided in Article 1139 of the Chapter, the stipulation that Article 1110 will come into effect in the case of either expropriation, or "a measure tantamount to . . . expropriation," will
undoubtedly extend protection to present and potential inves1 2
tors under a wide variety of scenarios.
For example, once the decision to grant a water export license has been made, Article 1106(1)(a) provides that "[n]o
Party may impose or enforce . . . in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, management, conduct or operation of an investment ... to export a given level or percentage
of goods or services . . . -"13 Under this Article, an American
investor, with interests in an enterprise that exports water
from Canada, may take recourse against the government if a
performance requirement limiting water export is attached to
the license. Action could well take the form of a claim of expro110 See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, 32 I.L.M. 639. Article 1110 provides:
1. No Party may directly or indirectly nationalize or expropriate an investment of an investor of another Party in its territory or take a measure tantamount to nationalization or expropriation of such an investment
("expropriation"), except:
(a) for a public purpose;
(b) on a non-discriminatory basis;
(c) in accordance with due process of law and Article 1105(1); and
(d) on payment of compensation in accordance with paragraphs 2 through 6.
Id.

111 See R.J. Hofley, NAFTA's Investment Dispute Regime Awaits Test, NAFTA

WATCH 7 (Sept. 15, 1994).
112 For example, the Canadian

government's cancellation of the privatization
of Toronto's International Airport and its proposal for the generic packaging of
cigarette packages have both been construed by U.S. investors as government actions "tantamount" to expropriation. These events may become the first investment disputes under NAFTA. It is worth noting that Article 1605 of the Free
Trade Agreement [hereinafter FTA] contained provisions similar to those of Article
1110 and no disputes arose. Canada-United States Free Trade Agreement, Jan. 2,
1988, 27 I.L.M. 281 (1988). See Hofley, supra note 110, at 7.
113 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1106, 32 I.L.M. 641.
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priation requiring compensation under Article 1110.114 In this
manner, control over the amount of water that leaves the country is taken away from the government and placed into the
hands of private interests. This fact is even more daunting
given that the California community of Goletta was prepared to
pay British Columbia exporters up to $2000 (U.S.) per acre foot
of delivered Canadian water. 115 As the door to water export has
already been opened, water will flow in increasingly large
volumes, to the point where it secures the most lucrative returns for investors.
Article 1114 will permit Canada to take environmental
measures to protect its water resources under Chapter
Eleven. 116 Under Article 1114 a Party may adopt, maintain or
enforce an environmental measure to ensure that investment
1 17
activity is undertaken in an environmentally sound manner.
However, such a measure must be consistent with the other
provisions of Chapter Eleven. This right is also limited by Article 1110 which works to grant investors compensation for acts
of expropriation or acts "tantamount to... expropriation."' 18 It
is difficult to conceive of the situation in which an environmental measure would not give rise to a claim for compensation. If
an investor has not yet availed itself of the Article 1110 protection, then an environmental measure, limiting the manner or
amount of a water export, would undoubtedly have some effect
upon the economic well-being of an investment. As a result, it
may be construed by an Investor-State tribunal as an "act tantamount to . . . expropriation" obliging Canada to pay
compensation. 119
114 Under Articles 1116 and 1117, action could also be taken on the basis that
Canada has breached a Chapter Eleven obligation. NAFTA, supra note 1, art.
1116, 1117, 32 1.L.M. 642. See infra notes 120-26 and accompanying text.
115 NAFTA AND WATER ExPoRTs, supra note 20, at 48.
116 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114, 32 I.L.M. 642.
117 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114, 32 I.L.M. 642.
118 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. 641.
119 The present moratorium on the issuance of water export licenses in British
Columbia could be challenged on the basis that such an action was an "act tantamount to ... expropriation." However, to date, no investor has taken this measure. Ross Curtis, Manager of Trade Policy for the British Columbia government,
holds that immense legal fees would make such an action economically infeasible
for an investor. Moreover, he contends that if the government was held liable for
compensation, it would quickly pass legislation to make the moratorium a law in
the province. This would entail even further legal costs on the behalf of investors.
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c. The Investor-State Dispute Settlement Procedure: Articles
1116 and 1117
Finally, dispute settlement mechanisms under Chapter
Eleven are unique in that an investor of a NAFTA Party may
submit a claim to arbitration if it believes it has incurred some
form of loss or damage due to the actions of another NAFTA
Party.120 This process is different from the more formal Stateto-State dispute settlement process of Chapter Twenty of the
Agreement. 121 Under Chapter Twenty, if an investor of a Party
feels that its host state has breached a Chapter Eleven obligation, perhaps by acting in a discriminatory manner, or by not
granting compensation in the event of expropriation, the investor may bring a claim regarding the breach of these obligations. 122 Therefore, while under most circumstances, only
national governments may appear before a dispute settlement
panel, 123 investors of a Party are accorded special privileges
under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA.
Moreover, an investor of a Party, who holds an interest in
the enterprise of another Party, may bring a similar claim on
behalf of that enterprise against the other Party.124 A concrete
example of this possibility is provided by the example of the engineering scheme of Multinational Resources, noted in Part II of
this paper. The North Thompson River Diversion proposal of
Multinational Resources is the joint project of Multinational
Water and Power Inc. and KVA Resources, an American company that would act as the project developer.'

25

In the event

that the government of British Columbia prevents the proposal,
or strictly regulates the granting of an export license, KVA ReTelephone Interview with Ross Curtis, Manager of Trade Policy, British Columbia, (Mar. 20, 1995). Note that under Articles 1116 and 1117, action could also be
taken on the basis that Canada has breached a Chapter Eleven obligation. See,
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1116, 1117, 32 I.L.M. 642.
120 See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, 32 I.L.M. 642-47.
121 See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 20, 32 I.L.M. 693.
122 See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, 32 I.L.M. 642-47.
123 See NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 20, 32 I.L.M. 693. See also, APPLETON, supra
note 49, at 145-55.
124 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1117, 32 I.L.M. 643. This Article essentially provides that an American investor in a Canadian corporation can bring an action
against the Canadian government, on behalf of the corporation, for the breach of a
Chapter Eleven obligation. Id.
125 NAFTA AND WATER ExPoRTs, supra note 20, at 48.
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sources could bring a claim of expropriation against Canada on
behalf of Multinational Resources. Therefore, the wide protection afforded to investors in this instance will have an impact
12 6
upon a traditionally domestic situation.
When control over the management of water is at issue,
Canada must take measures to avoid this type of adverse consequence. The following section of this paper suggests the possible legal means by which the viability of Canada's water
resources may be preserved, and examines the feasibility of
such means under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA.
Recommendations for Reconciling the Investment
Provisions of Chapter Eleven with Canadian Control
over Water Export

3.

While Canada is well-endowed with water resources at
present, a time may arrive when water scarcity, in important
areas such as Canada's prairie basin, will require the placing of
limits upon water usage for its own benefit. Reconciling this
need with existing or future NAFTA obligations, such as those
embodied in Chapter Eleven of the Agreement, will be an integral part of meeting this challenge.
Federal Legislation Banning the Export of Water

a.

A law similar to that envisioned by Bill C-156,12 7 which
would ban the export of water, seems the obvious means by
which to preserve Canada's water resources. However, the law
must contain certain components in order to be consistent with
Canada's NAFTA obligations. First, it must affect exporters
from all NAFTA Parties equally so that the national treatment
obligations of Article 1102 are not violated. Second, such a law
must purport to regulate water in its natural state and place
restrictions upon its general use. The law should not be drafted
such that it restricts the granting of a license for water export.
Rather, it must have an environmental objective, and aim to
regulate the general use and conservation of water. In this
manner, it will distance itself from the prohibition upon per126

For a more detailed analysis of Article 1117 see

APPLETON,

supra note 49, at

150.

127 Canadian Water Preservation Act, Bill C-156, House of Commons of Canada (Aug. 25, 1988); see Debates of the House of Commons, supra note 72.
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formance requirements in relation to the "establishment" or "acquisition" of an investment.128

There are, however, a number of obvious flaws inherent in
this recommendation. Legislation banning the export of water
would take away the right of all investors to establish an enterprise based upon water export and as such, would be an unpopular domestic measure. It is difficult to conceive of the
government placing an outright prohibition upon such a lucrative investment. Moreover, while the law would treat all investors in enterprises carrying out water export equally, it may
still violate the national treatment principle. For example, in
times of water shortage, there may exist Canadian enterprises
responsible for the transfer of water from British Columbia to
the prairie provinces. While these enterprises may not technically be exporters of water, they may be construed as being "in
like circumstances" to international water exporters. 129 As
such, if they are not equally affected by the legislation, a claim
could be made that Canada has not respected its national treatment obligations.
Moreover, as unrelated as a law banning water export may
be to the "establishment" or "acquisition" of an investment, it
would technically deny investors of their "interest in an enterprise."130 Thus, a claim could be made under Article 1110 that
the law is a "measure tantamount to . . .expropriation" of an

investment, triggering the requirement for the payment of compensation.1 31 This claim will hinge upon the interpretation of
Article 1110 by an Investor-State arbitration, but the inclusion
of the "measure tantamount to ...expropriation" concept in Ar-

ticle 1110 suggests that investors are to be granted generous
protection under Chapter Eleven.1 32 Claims of investors may
be buttressed by the fact that the law is an environmental mea-

128 For example, the Article 1106(1)(a) prohibition upon the establishment of
export levels only applies to water in the form of a "good." NAFTA, supra note 1,

art. 1106, 32 I.L.M. 640. As it has already been noted, water in its natural state is
not a "good."
129 NAFTA, supra note 1, art., 1102, 32 I.L.M. 639.
130 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1139, 32 I.L.M. 647.
131 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110, 32 I.L.M. 641.
132 NAFTA, supra note 1, ch. 11, 32 I.L.M. 641.
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sure inconsistent with Canada's NAFTA obligations as they re133
late to investment.
Finally, in prohibiting the export of water, Canada would
have to confront new problems posed by those export licenses
that are already in existence. As water is presently being
traded as a "good" under these licenses, an export restriction
would be subject to the proportional sharing obligation under
Article 315 of NAFTA.13 4 Accordingly, the proportion of total
water exports that had been made to another Party, relative to
the total supply of water in Canada, would have to be maintained regardless of the law. Thus, in a scenario where water
scarcity is coupled with a large number of existing export
licenses, an export prohibition would not work to effectively protect our water resources. This point stands as yet another illustration of why federal legislation banning the export of water
would likely create more problems than it solves.
b.

Canada's Right to Screen Specific Investments

The legal protection provided for investors and investments
under Chapter Eleven of NAFTA is not absolute. Under Annex
I of the Agreement, the Schedule of Canada permits discrimination against the investors or investments of another Party in
certain agreed upon sectors of the economy.1 35 This right has
been afforded to Canada so that it may protect certain domestic
industries that are integral to Canada's economy and that may
be threatened by the national treatment obligation of Chapter
Eleven of NAFTA. For example, in the Energy Sector of the
economy, persons holding oil and gas production licenses or
shares in such licenses "must be Canadian citizens ordinarily
resident in Canada, permanent residents or corporations incorporated in Canada." 36 In the Fisheries Sector, foreign fishing
vessels may not enter Canada's Exclusive Economic Zone "except under authority of a license or under treaty." 37 Moreover,
the Minister of Fisheries and Oceans "has discretionary author133 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1114, 32 I.L.M. 642.
134 Note that under Articles 309 and 315, legislation would have to be drafted
in the name of either Article XI.2(a) or Article XX(g) of GATT. NAFTA, supra note
1, arts. 309, 315, 32 I.L.M. 303.
135 NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex I, 32 I.L.M. 706.
136 NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex I, 32 J.L.M. 712.
137 NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex I, 32 I.L.M. 714.
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ity with respect to the issuance of licenses." 138 Both of these
provisions from Annex I work to discriminate against other
NAFTA Parties.
While none of the provisions of Annex I relate specifically to
water, a general exception, touching all sectors of the economy
and relating to investment, would prove to be an effective tool in
limiting the rights of investors under Chapter Eleven. This exception would permit Canada to screen all direct investments as
provided for by the Investment Canada Act. 13 9 Under this Act,
Canada retains the right to screen all direct investments by investors of United States or Mexico above a threshold initially
set at $5 million (Canadian). 140 This amount will be recalculated annually for such investments. 14 1 In the review process,
an applicant for an investment must demonstrate the net benefit to Canada of the proposed acquisition. 14 2 Most importantly,
Canada may impose requirements "in connection with the establishment, acquisition, expansion, conduct or operation of an
investment of an investor of another Party... ." -143 Therefore,
the onerous prohibition against performance requirements in
Article 1106 is lifted and strict conditions may be attached to
the entry of investments above a certain threshold. 4 4 Given
that any substantial water export scheme would likely be comprised of assets much greater than this threshold, 145 Annex I
grants Canada substantial control over its water resources.
While the inclusion of the Investment Canada Act in Annex
I leaves Canada considerable room for reservation, the exercise
of this power will be left to the political will of the day.
Whereas, the engineering proposals discussed earlier in this paper may eventually bring large financial returns to Canada,
138

NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex I, 32 I.L.M. 714.

139 R.S.C. 1985, ch. 28, (1st supp.).
140
141

142

NAFTA, supra note 1, Annex I, 32 I.L.M. 706.
R.S.C. 1985, ch.28, (1st supp.), amended by ch. 44, § 178, 1993 S.C.
NAFTA, supra note 1, 32 I.L.M. 706 (Annex I, para. 4 of the description

element of Canada's reservations with respect to investment).

143 NAFTA, supra note 1, 32 I.L.M. 706 (Annex I, para. 11 of the description
element of Canada's reservations with respect to investment).
14 In addition to strict conditions of entry, Canada also retains "the important

right to refuse entry altogether." See LIPSEY, SCHWANEN & WONNACOTT, supra

note 53, at 75.
145 For example, the Multinational Resources Proposal is a $3.8 billion (Canadian) venture. See NAFTA AND WATER EXPORTS, supra note 20, at 64.
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they will be accompanied by environmental destruction. In the
arena of free trade, one must presume that Canada will strive
to be as unrestrictive to investment as possible. 14 6 Accordingly,
the provisions of Annex I will not likely be used to refuse outright entry to an applicant desiring to invest in water export.
At best, performance requirements will be imposed on water
exporters.
c.

Provincial Capacity to Control the Export of Water

A more politically realistic goal is the extension of control
over the issuance of water export licenses to the provinces.
Management and allocation of water has its direct impact upon
those individuals or local communities dependent upon a particular water source. As such, a more regional approach to the
designation of water for export is clearly the most appropriate
manner in which to deal with the issue. 14 7 Provincial governments which are more accountable to public concern over water
resources, and more sensitive to local reliance upon water, are
most likely to formulate a responsible water export policy in the
face of NAFTA.
Article 1108 of NAFTA is extremely important in this respect. Under its terms "[e]ach Party may set out in its Schedule to Annex I, within two years after the entry into force of this
Agreement, any existing non-conforming measures maintained
by a state or a province." 148 Moreover, Article 1102, which involves national treatment for investors and investments of a
Party, and Article 1106, which prohibits performance requirements for investors and investments of a Party, do not apply to
146 Note that the OECD Committee on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises on a Standstill on National Treatment Measures made a declaration of understanding in 1988 stating "that Member countries avoid the
introduction of new measures or practices which constitute exceptions to the present National Treatment instrument." See OECD Declaration and Decisions on International Investment and Multinational Enterprises supra note 105, at 24. As a
member of the OECD, Canada's foreign investment policies will likely become
more liberalized than restrictive.
147 For this reason, Canada's system of federalism designates most legislative
jurisdiction over natural resources to the provinces. For a detailed analysis of the
many issues related to federal and provincial jurisdiction over natural resources
see MANAGING RESOURCES IN A FEDERAL STATE (Owen J. Saunders ed., 1985).
148 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1108(2), 32 I.L.M. 641.
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such "existing non-conforming measures." 149 Essentially, Article 1108 works to preserve provincial autonomy over those matters within provincial jurisdiction that are threatened by the
investment provisions of NAFTA. 150 Water resource management, especially in those provinces that are under pressure to
increase water exports, is a prime example of such a matter.151
While Article 1108 extends substantial control to the provinces in various matters, it may only be applicable to the extent
that a provincial measure relates to investment. In the context
of water resources, this requirement places a severe limitation
upon provincial control of water export. Ross Curtis believes
that the issuance of water export licenses cannot be construed
as relating directly to the matter of investment. 5 2 He further
contends that because a license for export is more attached to
the production of a "good," it would be unjustifiable to construe
legislation regarding a water export license as an exception to.
the investment provisions of NAFTA.153 Moreover, it is unlikely that the federal government would assent to the inclusion
of such a restrictive law in Annex I of NAFTA. Accordingly, an
NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1108(1)(a)(ii), 32 I.L.M. 640.
150 Note that if the investment provisions of Chapter Eleven were incorporated
into Annex I of the Agreement, all Parties, including Canada, would have to adhere to them, regardless of restrictive provincial legislation. Article 105 of NAFTA
provides: "The Parties shall ensure that all necessary measures are taken in order
to give effect to the provisions of this Agreement including their observance, except
as otherwise provided in this Agreement, by state, provincial and local governments." NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 105, 32 I.L.M. 298. (emphasis added).
151 British Columbia is undoubtedly the province most in need of a water export policy. Inundated with lucrative offers from the American Southwest, and
endowed with freshwater resources, this province has no firm legislation or policy
relating to water export. Licenses for water removal from rivers in the province
fall under the governance of the Water Act, R.S.B.C. 1979, ch.429. However, appurtenance requirements on water removal, which may be imposed under section
10(e) of the Water Act, are not consistent with Article 1106 of NAFTA. Note that in
the context of the Water Act, "appurtenancy" refers to the extent that water must
be used in relation with, or for the benefit of, the land upon which it is found.
Because strict appurtenancy requirements would stymie the goals of water exporters, their inconsistency with the provisions of NAFTA is obvious. This issue must
be dealt with soon because the two year period terminates on January 1, 1996. At
the time this paper was prepared, the New Democratic Party government in British Columbia was preparing a comprehensive Bill relating to water export that
will soon be tabled in the provincial legislature. Telephone interview with Ross
Curtis, British Columbia Manager of Trade Policy (Feb. 28, 1995).
152 Telephone Interview with Ross Curtis, supra note 119.
153 Telephone Interview with Ross Curtis, supra note 119.
149
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upcoming bill on water export in British Columbia will not pur54
port to fall under the Article 1108 reservations.1
This legislation may nevertheless be unassailable under
NAFTA, limiting the "establishment, acquisition, expansion...
[or] operation" of investment by placing conditions upon the issuance of licenses for export. 15 5 Such legislation may be construed as a prohibited performance requirement under Article
1106 or, a "measure tantamount to... expropriation" of an investment under Article 1110.156 If the matter was heard by a
dispute panel, it could be argued that the legislation is both consistent and justified under Chapter Nine of NAFTA as a Standards-Related Measure. 157 If it is ruled as a valid measure, 15 8 a
panel would have no choice but to invoke Article 1112(1) which
provides, "[i]n the event of any inconsistency between this
Chapter and another Chapter, the other Chapter shall prevail
to the extent of the inconsistency." 59 In this manner, a provincial water export law could be justified despite Canada's onerous obligations in Chapter Eleven. 160 Such legislation appears
154 However, as it has already been noted, the umbrella of protection has been
opened very generously for investors and their investments under NAFTA. This
point is substantiated by legal opinions circulating over the pending dispute on the
generic packaging of cigarettes; in this instance product trademarks are being construed as "investments" by U.S. tobacco manufacturers. Ottawa Claims Plain
Packs Deter Smokers, FINANCIAL POST, May 20, 1995, available in WESTLAW,
ALLNEWS Library. Similarily, it should be possible under Article 1108 to extend
provincial reservations against the protection for investment just as broadly.
While a license for water export enables one to produce a "good," it is also a form of
"intangible property" making it an investment for the purposes of Article 1139.
This author submits that if a water export license could be construed as an investment, a provincial law regulating the granting of such a license, would be justified
as an Article 1108 exception.
155 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1106(1), 32 I.L.M. 640.
156 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1110(1), 32 I.L.M. 641.
157 Article 915 defines "standards" as "[rules, guidelines or characteristics for
goods or related processes and production methods .... " NAFTA, supra note 1, art.
915, 32 I.L.M. 392. Note that Chapter Nine appears to give leeway to the provinces for the establishment of such a standard. Article 902 does not hold Canada
to as high a standard in ensuring provincial compliance with NAFTA as does Article 105. NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 902, 32 I.L.M. 386.
158 Under Article 904, it would have to be proven that the law is made in the
pursuance of a legitimate objective, does not discriminate against the goods of another Party, and does not create an unnecessary obstacle to trade. NAFTA, supra
note 1, art. 904, 32 LL.M. 387.
159 NAFTA, supra note 1, art. 1112(1), 32 I.L.M. 643.
160 Clearly, the issue of water export opens up a complex interplay between the
National Treatment and Market Access for Goods provisions of Chapter Three, the
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to be the most effective means with which Canadian control
over water resources may be maintained in the face of NAFTA's
161
investment provisions.
IV.

CONCLUSION

The apparent threat to Canada's water resources posed
first by the FTA and now by NAFTA, provoked many charges
that Canada's lakes and rivers would eventually run dry under
free trade. Undoubtedly, such a threat is conceivable. The important agricultural regions and massive urban centers of the
North American Southwest are willing to pay a high price for
pure and plentiful water while Canada, a country comprised of
less than one tenth of North America's population, is extremely
well-endowed with fresh water resources. Because of this situation, extensive engineering schemes for massive diversions or
Investment provisions of Chapter Eleven, and the Standards-Related Measures
provisions of Chapter Nine. Other parts of NAFTA that are beyond the scope of
this paper, such as the Nullification and Impairment provisions of Annex 2004
may also enter into the debate over water export. The evolution of this issue under
the Agreement will depend upon how eager the federal or provincial governments
are to export water, the manner in which licenses for water export are regulated,
and whether an investor or a NAFTA Party brings an action against Canada in
reaction to Canadian policy or legislation.
161 While the contents of such a law are well beyond the scope of this paper,
many changes must be made to existing provincial legislation. For example, the
British Columbia Water Act is not an effective tool for water resources management because it only sets out the process by which the government is to allocate
water in the province. New legislation must focus on the ecological impact of water
export and create mechanisms that will protect water resources. In this respect,
the following measures would be appropriate: 1) water pricing that creates incentives to avoid waste and use water efficiently; 2) designating certain rivers, lakes
or watersheds as environmentally sensitive or integral to the well-being of an
ecosystem, Aboriginal groups, communities, or local industries; 3) ensuring public
consultation and participation in the granting of a license for water export; and 4)
placing strict appurtenance requirements upon all licenses granting the removal of
water from rivers in an attempt to confine the use of the water to the parcel of land
upon which it is found. Ross Curtis has indicated that this final measure will be a
predominant characteristic of the upcoming legislation of British Columbia. Telephone Interview with Ross Curtis, supra note 119. For a more detailed examination of what may be expected of a future water policy see PROVINCE OF BRITISH
COLUMBIA, STEWARDSHIP OF THE WATER OF BRITISH COLUMBIA:

A

REVIEW OF BRIT-

(1993). See also,
P.H. Pearse, F. Bertrand & J.W. MacLean, Water Managementfor the Future,Currents of Change, in FINAL REPORT OF THE INQUIRY ON FEDERAL WATER POLICY 95110 (Environment Canada 1985).
ISH COLUMBIA'S WATER MANAGEMENT POLICY AND LEGISLATION
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exports of water, which will be facilitated under free trade, are
frequently proposed.
Despite these realities, many of NAFTA's criticisms, and its
impact on Canadian water were simply not founded in law.
Massive projects such as the NAWAPA will not find their fruition in the provisions of Chapter Three of the Agreement. This
is evident from both the Parties' intention and the fact that natural water cannot be considered as a "good" under NAFTA.
Moreover, the national treatment obligation in this same Chapter does not legally bind Canada to make water available as a
"good" to other NAFTA Parties. National treatment need only
be extended to the imported goods of another Party. Only when
government makes the decision to allow for the export of water
does NAFTA provide that restrictions upon export be accompanied by corresponding restrictions on water use in the domestic
domain. Given that water exports from Canada are presently
negligible, the tap of Chapter Three that allegedly opened the
flow of water from north to south simply does not exist. Canada
remains in control of its water in this regard.
If there is a true threat to Canada's water, it is posed by the
provisions of Chapter Eleven of NAFTA, which were left surprisingly uncondemned by critics of the Agreement. The extension of national treatment to the investors of all NAFTA
countries will place all NAFTA investors on an equal playing
field. Other provisions of the Chapter, such as the prohibition
on performance requirements, and the broad legal remedies
available to investors, will work to open the door to investment
in Canada. As such, any individual from another NAFTA country holding an interest in an enterprise established for the export or diversion of water, will enjoy all of the benefits and
protection of Chapter Eleven of NAFTA. In this regard, Canada's control over the management of its water resources has
been compromised.
Measures that can be taken to rectify this situation are limited but not futile. Federal legislation banning the export of
water by investors of all NAFTA Parties would only prevent future exports of water. Moreover, this is not a politically realistic
measure given both Canada's obligations to foster foreign investment and the potential returns of such an investment. The
right Canada holds to screen and potentially deny investment
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under Annex I of NAFTA is also a valuable tool. However, in
the context of water export, the exercise of this right shall remain subject to the political will of the day. Lastly, the Chapter
Eleven reservations made for provincial measures affecting investment could be used in the formulation of responsible legislation on water export. If a provincial law is not made upon the
basis of Chapter Eleven it could still be justified on a number of
fronts.
In sum, all potential solutions are based upon the premise
that the Canadian government is willing to make prudent decisions regarding water export. In this sense, perhaps the greatest threat to Canada's water is a lack of political will. Fresh
water will certainly become an increasingly valuable commodity
in the future, but it should also be considered as the most important 162 of Canada's dwindling ecological resources. The volume of water leaving Canada in the years to come will be
indicative of our government's position in this debate. For in
the final analysis, the Canadian government's action or inaction, not the provisions of NAFTA, shall determine how much of
Canada's water will flow to the highest bidder.

162 Taking nothing away from the importance of other natural resources, the
implications for many Canadian industries would be grave if Canada's fresh water
resources went the unfortunate way of the Atlantic cod stocks. Hopefully William
Blake's oft-cited "Proverb of Hell," "You never know what is enough unless you
know what is more than enough," will not be the standard employed by the Canadian Government if it chooses to open the tap to water export. WILLIAM BLAKE,
PROVERBS OF HELL (1790).
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